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The Relationship Between Motion Picture
Distribution and Exhibition: An
Analysis of the Effects of Anti-Blind
Bidding Legislation
by SUZANNE ILENE SCHILLER*
I
Introduction
Since the late 1940's, the distribution and exhibition arms of
the motion picture industry have been independently owned.1
However, each entity is dependent on the other for survival.
Exhibitors, those who own theaters, must license films from
distributors and distributors must rely on exhibitors to dissemi-
nate their product. Competition for screen space and films with
blockbuster potential is particularly keen during the peak sea-
sons - Christmas, summer, and Easter.
The relationship between distributors and exhibitors is often
characterized as one of "mutual distrust."2 Early on, exhibi-
tors feared the power wielded by the major studios.' This ri-
valry for survival and control led to substantial vertical
integration within the industry.4 But even when ownership
was consolidated, battles raged between the two branches with
* Member, Third Year Class; B.A., Bennington College, 1983. The author
wishes to thank Mark Schiller, a knowledgeable source, a patient sounding board, and
a good friend.
1. Prior to 1948, the major film studios not only produced and distributed films,
but also owned and operated the theaters in which their movies were shown. Eventu-
ally, the Department of Justice intervened and brought an action against the studios
for violation of antitrust laws. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131
(1948). The dispute was finally settled when the studios agreed to divest themselves
of the theaters. See infra notes 34-37 and accompanying text. For a thorough analysis
of these antitrust actions, see M. CONANT, ANTITRUST IN THE MOTION PICTURE INDUS-
TRY (1960).
2. Myers, The Studio as Distributor, in THE MOVIE BUSINESS BOOK 275, 281 (J.
Squire ed. 1983).
3. Zukor, Origin and Growth of the Movies (1927), in THE MOVIES IN OUR MIDST
112, 120 (G. Mast ed. 1982).
4. Id. at 120-22; see iqfra note 33 and accompanying text.
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exhibition controlling the profits and production/distribution
controlling the expenditures.5
Today, the conflict remains one of control. Exhibitors want
the ability to select films based on their own judgment of what
the public wants, but their choices are mostly confined to what
is produced by the major studios. The studios meanwhile want
to prevent bullying by exhibitors while retaining their freedom
to choose the outlets for their products.6
One of the latest battles in this continuing rivalry is the prac-
tice of blind bidding. Blind bidding is defined as "the offering
or bidding for, negotiating for, or agreeing to terms for the li-
censing or exhibition of a motion picture if the motion picture
has not been trade screened within the [local geographic area]
before any such event has occurred."7 A trade screening is the
showing of a motion picture being distributed which is open to
any interested exhibitor.' Since 1978, twenty-four states,9
Prince George's County, Maryland, and Puerto Rico have en-
acted statutes which prohibit the licensing of any motion pic-
ture prior to its being trade screened for exhibitors. Some of
these statutes also regulate bidding procedures, prohibit or
limit the payment of guarantees and/or advances, and limit
clearances and lengths of first runs, all of which affect distribu-
tor-exhibitor relationships.10
While the anti-blind bidding statutes are intended to equalize
5. Huettig, The Motion Picture Industry Today (1944), in THE MOVIES IN OUR
MIDST 383, 388 (G. Mast ed. 1982). This article is an excellent introduction to the
market structure of the film industry just prior to the intervention by the Depart-
ment of Justice.
6. See Murphy, Distribution and Exhibition: An Overview, in THE MOVIE BUSI-
NESS BOOK 243, 246-47 (J. Squire ed. 1983).
7. MODEL MOTION PICTURE FAIR COMPETITION ACT art. II, 9 (National Ass'n of
Theater Owners 1977). See also infra note 120.
8. See MODEL MOTION PICTURE FAIR COMPETITION ACT art. II, 8 (National
Ass'n of Theater Owners 1977).
9. These states are: Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Ken-
tucky, Louisiana, Maine (repealed), Massachusetts, Missouri, Montana, New Mexico,
North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Vir-
ginia, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.
10. Guarantees and advances are forms of prepayment by the exhibitor. See infra
notes 47 & 48 and accompanying text. Clearance defines the geographic area in which
a particular exhibitor will be the only one screening the film. See infra note 46 and
accompanying text. A run is the continous exhibition of a motion picture in a particu-
lar area. Id.; MODEL MOTION PICTURE FAIR COMPETITION ACT art. II, 10 (National
Ass'n of Theater Owners 1977). A first run is the first exhibition of the film in a
specified geographic area. MODEL MOTION PICTURE FAIR COMPETITION ACT art. II,
10 (National Ass'n of Theater Owners 1977).
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the bargaining power between major distributors and exhibi-
tors," the positive impact on the industry as a whole seems to
be minimal. Indeed, this note argues that those who perhaps
need protection the most - the independent distributors and
small exhibitors - are more likely to be adversely affected by
the statutes.
Part II of this note examines the parties involved and reviews
the development and present status of motion picture licensing.
Part III traces the history of blind bidding and the attempts to






Motion picture distributors are generally separated into two
main categories - majors, who dominate the market, and in-
dependents.12 Since the major distributors have vast financial
resources, they also tend to be the major producers of films
and, therefore, distributor in reference to these companies is
often synonomous with studio. The Motion Picture Association
of America (MPAA), a trade association, represents the inter-
ests of the major film distributors: Warner Brothers Distribut-
ing Corp., Paramount Pictures Corp., Columbia Pictures
Industries, Inc., Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., Universal
Pictures Division of Universal City Studios, Inc., MGM/UA En-
tertainment Co., Inc., Orion Pictures, Inc., and Buena Vista
Distribution Co., Inc. (the distribution arm of Walt Disney Stu-
dios). 3 In 1984, these eight distributors plus Avco Embassy
Pictures Corp., also considered a major at that time, accounted
11. Associated Film Distribution Corp. v. Thornburgh, 614 F. Supp. 1100, 1104
(E.D. Pa. 1985), on remand from 683 F.2d 808 (3d Cir. 1982), rev'g 520 F. Supp. 971
(D.C. Pa. 1981), cert. denied, - U.S. - (1987) [hereinafter Associated Film
Distribution].
12. See, e.g., Statfeld, Blind Bidding: or What Should be Playing at the Bijou?, 11
PERF. ARTS REV. 27 (1981). Originally, "major" distributors were those with the larg-
est market shares. Now however, the term is used loosely to refer to those companies
represented by the Motion Picture Association of America. Id. at 28. For a discussion
of the market structure of distributors, see Conant, The Paramount Decrees Reconsid-
ered, 44 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 79, 89-92 (1981).
13. Telephone interview with Anne Grupp, Esq., West Coast Counsel, Motion Pic-
ture Association of America (Oct. 21, 1985).
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for 88.8 percent of domestic box office revenues.' By 1986,
however, the majors only garned eighty-one percent of market
rentals.'5
Independent distributors range from small importers of for-
eign films to larger producers such as Tri-Star Pictures, Inc.,
Cannon Films, Inc., and New World Pictures, Inc.. In fact, in
1984, Tri-Star garnered 5.2 percent of domestic box office reve-
nues, more than two of the so-called majors, Buena Vista and
Embassy.' 6 In 1985, Tri-Star's market rentals jumped to ten
percent. While they came down to seven percent in 1986, this
percentage is still much larger than MGM/UA's four percent. 7
2. Exhibitors
Exhibitors are represented by two trade associations - the
National Association of Theater Owners (NATO) and the
newer National Independent Theatre Exhibitors (NITE). Ex-
hibitors range in size from large conglomerates, such as Gen-
eral Cinema Corporation, which owns over 1,000 screens and
has interests in soft drink bottling plants and Carter Hawley
Hale Stores, 18 to single screen art houses. The ten largest thea-
ter chains, or circuits, usually account for fifty percent of a ma-
jor distributor's income in any given year.' 9 Furthermore,
unlike the distribution side of the industry, exhibition is ex-
panding. The number of screens was expected to grow overall
by 7.4 percent in 1985,20 with some companies projecting an in-
crease of over ten percent.2' Theaters are also retaining a
14. Murphy, Warners Noses Par in B.O. Race, Daily Variety, Jan. 4, 1985, at 1, col.
4.
15. Murphy, Northern American Theatrical Market Shares: 1970-1986, Daily Va-
riety, Jan. 14, 1987, at 58, col. 3 (chart). Embassy Pictures is not included in recent
figures because the company was bought by Columbia Pictures in 1985 and the distri-
bution arm was sold to Dino DeLaurentis. Id. Additionally, film rental figures vary
slightly from the box office revenue figures, but in 1986 the difference was minimal.
See Final 1986 Domestic B.O. Market Shares, Daily Variety, Jan. 6, 1987, at 1, col. 3
(chart).
16. Murphy, supra note 14. Buena Vista garnered only 4.2% of the box office and
Embassy a mere .3%.
17. Murphy, supra note 14.
18. General Cinema Corp., 52 STANDARD NYSE STOCK REPORTS, No. 117, Sec. 9
(June 18, 1985).
19. Myers, supra note 2, at 276.
20. Cieply, U.S. May Soon Allow Film Studios to Own Domestic Movie Theaters,
Wall St. J., Dec. 7, 1984, at 25, col. 4.
21. United Artists Communications, 51 STANDARD OTC STOCK REPORTS, No. 60,
Sec. 32 (May 24, 1985) ("... the company said it would add [to its present number of
1,057] 100 to 150 new movie screens in fiscal 1985."). The number of screens continues
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larger share of box office revenues22 and the increased number




When filmmaking first developed, films were relatively short
and inexpensive to produce. The most economical and efficient
way to exhibit films was to sell prints directly to theaters.
24
The cost was usually determined by the total length of the film,
measured in feet.25
Changes occurred as films grew in length, and audiences soon
demanded films featuring particular stars such as Mary Pick-
ford or Charlie Chaplin.26 These acknowledged stars realized
their true worth and demanded higher salaries and more con-
trol over the pictures they worked on. 27 Second, the studio sys-
tem, whereby actors, directors, and other participants worked
under contract for a particular studio, began to develop and
crystallize.28 Studios committed themselves to paying regular
salaries regardless of whether their employees were actually
working on a particular film. These factors combined to in-
crease the costs of making a motion picture,29 and the methods
for exhibiting films changed to accommodate this development.
The first change took place around 1915 when distributors
switched from selling a print outright to licensing or renting
it.3° When a print is sold outright to an exhibitor it may be
displayed and used without limitation. Under a licensing
scheme, a distributor retains ownership of the actual print and
the exhibitor's use of the print is limited by contract.3 1
to grow. See Tusher, UA New King of Exhibition Hill, Daily Variety, Jan. 6, 1987, at
1, col. 4.
22. Murphy, Distribs'B.O. Share Below 40%, Daily Variety, Aug. 21, 1984, at 1, col.
5.
23. See supra note 18 ("Improved cost structures resulting from increased film
releases and higher per-capita concession sales should enhance theatre profits.").
24. J. ELLIS, A HISTORY OF FILM 74 (2d ed. 1985).
25. Id. See also Murphy, supra note 6, at 244.
26. J. ELLIS, supra note 24, at 74.
27. Id. at 71, 135.
28. Id. at 179.
29. Id. at 135.
30. Murphy, supra note 6, at 244.




The other major change to take place was the vertical inte-
gration of the industry. 2 Theater owners such as William Fox
began to produce their own films, and studio owners such as
Adolph Zukor of Paramount began to buy theaters to exhibit
the films they were making.a3 When these companies grew too
large, exhibitors not affiliated with any studio were crowded
out of the business. Finally, in 1948, the Department of Justice
brought suit. In United States v. Paramount Pictures,4 the
United States Supreme Court affirmed a district court's order
ruling several of the major studios' trade practices illegal. It
then remanded the case to the district court to consider the pos-
sibility of divesting major studios from their theater ownership.
The district court concluded that the divorce of exhibition
from production and distribution was the proper remedy.5
Prior to the district court's order, several studios had already
consented to divestment; the court's order also was effectuated
by consent decrees3 6 entered into between the Department of
Justice and the individual studios.
In the thirty-five years since the divorce of theaters and stu-
dios, licensing has developed even further. Initially, distribu-
tors received from exhibitors a fixed percentage of box office
gross revenues.38 This percentage ranged from fifteen percent
to twenty-five percent, and was often dependent on the quality
of the film and the star or stars featured.3 a Later license fees
32. In this context, vertical integration is the ownership by one company of the
production, distribution, and exhibition functions. By the late 1940's, five studios
were fully integrated. Murphy, supra note 6, at 247.
33. Murphy, supra note 6, at 246-47. For a truly unique and first-hand view of the
development of the vertical integration of the film industry, see Zukor, supra note 3
at 119-22.
34. 334 U.S. 131, 161-66 (1948).
35. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 85 F. Supp. 881, 897 (S.D.N.Y. 1949),
affd 339 U.S. 974 (1950).
36. Consent decrees are agreements by the defendants to refrain from practices
alleged to be illegal by the government. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 370 (5th ed. 1979).
37. These consent decrees were: United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 1948-9
Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 62,335 (S.D.N.Y. 1948) (entered into by RKO); United States v.
Paramount Pictures, Inc., 1948-9 Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,377 (S.D.N.Y. 1949) (entered
into by Paramount); United States v. Loew's, Inc. 1950-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,765
(S.D.N.Y. 1951) (entered into by Warner Bros.); United States v. Loew's, Inc. 1950-1
Trade Cas. 62,861 (S.D.N.Y. 1951) (entered into by Twentieth Century-Fox); United
States v. Loew's, Inc. 1952-3 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1T 62,228 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (entered into
by Loew's).
38. Associated Film Distribution, 614 F. Supp. at 1103.
39. Murphy, Some Comments on the Evolution of the 90/10 Licensing Format
(Dec. 9, 1984) (unpublished manuscript). See also Murphy, supra note 6, at 244.
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were based on a sliding scale term whereby the percentage that
distributors received grew in proportion to the weekly box of-
fice gross. 4
0
2. Present Licensing Terms
The prevailing percentage split between distributors and ex-
hibitors is known as the 90/10 format.41 Under this arrange-
ment, the distributor receives ninety percent of the box office
receipts after the house allowance, or nut, is deducted.42 The
house allowance is, theoretically, equal to the theater's operat-
ing expenses. However, this term is now negotiable and gener-
ally considered to include some built-in profit.43 Most contracts
also contain a provision for a floor, a minimum fixed percent-
age of the box office gross which will be paid to the
distributor.4 4
Typical floors for a major, first-run release are seventy per-
cent for the first few weeks, sixty percent for the next, and so
on.45 For example, in a contract which provides for a house al-
lowance of $5,000 and a seventy percent floor, if the box office
takes in $20,000, the distributor will receive $14,000 and the ex-
hibitor will keep $6,000. If there were no floor, the exhibitor
would receive his house allowance of $5,000 plus ten percent of
the remaining $15,000 or $1,500. The distributor would receive
only $13,500.
Other common contract terms define the length of time the
film will play in a particular theater (the run), and the geo-
graphic area in which an exhibitor retains an exclusive license
(the clearance). 46 Provisions are also made for guarantees, non-
refundable deposits paid by exhibitors prior to the start of the
run,47 and advances, deposits paid by exhibitors which are re-
fundable if the distributor's share is less than the amount
paid.48
40. Associated Film Distribution, 614 F. Supp. at 1103.
41. Murphy, supra note 6, at 244, 253; Fellman, The Exhibitor, in THE MOVIE Busi-
NESS BOOK 313, 315 (J. Squire ed. 1983); Note, Blind Bidding and the Motion Picture
Industry, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1128, 1131 n.15 (1979).
42. Fellman, supra note 41, at 315.
43. Murphy, supra note 6, at 253.
44. Fellman, supra note 41, at 317; Murphy, supra note 6, at 245.
45. Murphy, supra note 6, at 245.
46. Fellman, supra note 41, at 315.




Finally, while the distributor pays the cost of national adver-
tising, the cost of regional advertising is often shared between
the distributor and exhibitor.49 Typically, exhibitors pay either
a flat fee or a proportionate share based on the actual box office
percentages.5 ° In the example above (where there is no floor,
the house allowance is $5,000 and the box office takes in
$20,000), the distributor would pay 67.5 percent of the local ad-
vertising costs. The exhibitor would pay 32.5 percent, the ex-
hibitor's take of $6,500 being 32.5 percent of the $20,000 gross
receipts.
3. Economic Effects
Because licensing terms and economics are often identified as
the cause of dissension between distributors and exhibitors, it is
instructive to examine how present licensing practices affect
their relationship.5 1 There appears to be only two scenarios in
which the exhibitor will fail to make a profit. The first occurs
when an exhibitor puts up a large guarantee which is not
matched by the the box office proceeds owed to the distributor.
Thus, under the previous example, if the exhibitor had paid a
guarantee of $16,000, he would retain only $4,000, less than his
assumed house expense of $5,000. While it is unknown how
often this actually occurs, one studio executive estimated that
unearned guarantees, the excess revenue made by the distribu-
tor when his share of the box office receipts does not equal or
exceed the amount guaranteed by the exhibitor, accounted for
less than one percent of total film rentals.2 In Pennsylvania,
unearned guarantees accounted for 4.3 percent of the major dis-
tributors' rental income during unregulated periods. 3 On a
particularly successful film, however, the exhibitor can make
back these payments in the first day or week of the run. 4
The other instance in which an exhibitor loses money occurs
when the exhibitor's share of the box office revenues are less
than the house allowance. For example, if there is a 90/10 split,
seventy percent floor, $5,000 house allowance, and box office
49. See, e.g., Myers, supra note 2, at 280.
50. Durwood & Resnick, The Theatre Chain: American Multi-Cinema, in THE
MOVIE BUSINESS BOOK 327, 331 (J. Squire ed. 1983).
51. See, e.g., Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Rhodes, 496 F. Supp. 408, 415 (S.D.
Ohio 1980) affd in part, remanded in part 679 F.2d 656 (6th Cir. 1982).
52. Myers, supra note 2, at 282.
53. Associated Film Distribution, 614 F. Supp. at 1110.
54. Murphy, supra. note 6, at 246.
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revenues of only $15,000, the seventy percent floor will be acti-
vated and the exhibitor will receive only $4,500. However, once
box office receipts reach $16,666.67, the exhibitor will retain
more than his operating expenses regardless of whether or not
the floor is activated.
When concession sales are taken into account, the exhibitor
will often make more than his operating expenses even if box
office receipts are below this critical 'figure. Concession sales
comprise approximately thirty-five percent of the exhibitor's
total receipts5 and seventy to eighty percent of that figure rep-
resents profit over the food costs. 6 No part of this is paid to the
distributor, despite the fact that it is the distributor's film
which attracts the popcorn-hungry audience.
A distributor's profit is not as certain as an exhibitor's profit.
The estimated average cost of producing and distributing a
first-run motion picture may be as high as $20 million. Only
two out of ten films break even or turn a profit.5 Additionally,
while the exhibitor's return is almost immediate, the distribu-
tor/producer begins making his investment years before a
film's release. Guarantees and advances are rarely, if ever, pay-
able more than a couple of weeks before the film opens.59
Merely the interest on the funds borrowed to make a film can
be staggering.60 Furthermore, exhibitors have been known to
underreport box office gross receipts61 or hold receipts until af-
ter they are due, 2 thus reducing distributor profits even
further.
55. Murphy, supra note 22, at 13, col. 1.
56. Lowe, Refreshment Sales and Theatre Profits, in THE MOVIE BUSINESS BOOK,
343, 345 (J. Squire ed. 1983).
57. Associated Film Distribution, 614 F. Supp. at 1104.
58. Myers, supra note 2, at 283.
59. Murphy, supra note 6, at 246.
60. It has been estimated that the interest on Heaven's Gate, a 1979 release, was
$14 million by March 1980. 1 T. SELTZ & M. SIMENSKY, ENTERTAINMENT LAW § 2-4
(1983) (citing Harmetz, Coppola: Will He Break Even?, NY Times, Mar. 18, 1980, at
C7). The interest on Close Encounters of a Third Kind, which cost $22 million, was
approximately $200,000 per month. MOTION PICTURE ASS'N OF AMERICA, BLIND BID-
DING OF MOTION PICTURES 13 (1981), reprinted in National Association of Theater
Owners, Blind Bidding Position Paper 12 (available from NATO, 1560 Broadway, New
York, NY 10036 [hereinafter NATO position paper]. (1981).
61. See, e.g., Theater Operators Facing Suit By Eight Distributors, Daily Variety,
March 7, 1985, at 4, col. 1; WB To Exhibs: Report B.O. Accurately or Lose Films, Daily
Variety, May 13, 1985, at 1, col. .1; D.A. 's Showbiz Task Force Accuses Kurstin Theaters
of Under-Reporting B. 0., Daily Variety, May 21, 1985, at 1, col. 1; Myers, supra note 2,
at 283.




There are two methods of licensing a motion picture.63 Until
very recently, the most common method was bidding.64 Under
this process, a distributor sends out a bid solicitation to all ex-
hibitors in a given geographic area.6 These invitations to bid
typically describe the picture and may include names of the
stars and director, as well as the available date and suggested
terms.66 Exhibitors then submit their bids. While the 90/10 for-
mat is almost always firm,67 advances, guarantees, clearances,
and runs are all generally negotiable. The distributor makes
his decision as to which exhibitor will receive the license based
on these factors, the size and location of the theater as well as
other, more intangible, factors.6
The other method of licensing is negotiation, wherein the dis-
tributor directly contacts one specific exhibitor to construct a
mutually agreeable licensing contract.69 Due to the lack of
competition, negotiation usually results in lower terms for the
distributor and, while bid terms are understood to be firm, °
negotiated terms are considered maximums and can be lowered
if the film is not as successful as predicted.' 1 Generally, negotia-
tion will be used when there is little or no competition among
exhibitors,72 insufficient time before the release date to bid a
film,73 or following a round of bidding in which the distributor
receives bids which he feels are unacceptable.74 When the dis-
tributor chooses to deal with some, but not all, exhibitors in a
particular area, he will utilize competitive negotiation, thereby
playing one exhibitor off another. 5
63. Associated Film Distribution, 614 F. Supp. at 1103.
64. See Durwood & Resnick, supra note 50, at 330.
65. See Fellman, supra note 41, at 315.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Associated Film Distribution, 614 F. Supp. at 1110. See also Plaintiff's Trial
Brief at 18-20, Associated Film Distribution.
69. Associated Film Distribution, 614 F. Supp. at 1103.
70. Id.
71. Id.; Plaintiff's Trial Brief at 25, Associated Film Distribution.
72. Associated Film Distribution, 614 F. Supp. at 1103.
73. Bidding can take from two to four weeks. See telephone interview, supra
note 13.
74. Associated Film Distribution, 614 F. Supp. at 1103.
75. Id.
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5. Controversial Licensing Practices
Over the years, distributors and exhibitors have found vari-
ous ways of gaining an edge in their dealings with each other.76
As described below, these practices include block booking,
four-walling, product splitting, and relationships.
The most common of these practices was block booking,
77
whereby a distributor licensed one or more potentially success-
ful films to a particular exhibitor in exchange for an express
promise by that exhibitor to play other less profitable films as
well." This practice was outlawed by the consent decrees en-
tered into in the late 1940's.79
Another less common practice is four-walling. When a film is
four-walled, rather than licensing the film, the distributor
leases the theater from the exhibitor.8 " Arguably, this violates
the consent decrees as it is the exhibition of a motion picture by
a distributor.81 However, at the present time, four-walling ap-
pears to be an acceptable form of licensing.8 2 Indeed, as one
commentator has suggested, four-walling on a limited basis
may be beneficial to the industry because the risks are shifted
entirely away from the exhibitor and onto the distributor, who
is in a better position to evaluate the profitability of the film.8 3
More recently, however, exhibitors have been flexing their
bargaining muscles. The most popular of the practices initi-
ated by exhibitors is known as product splitting. A split occurs
when the exhibitors in a certain geographic area agree to allo-
cate upcoming motion pictures among themselves.8 4 Competi-
tion for each film is reduced, thereby lowering the distributor's
negotiating power and lowering his terms.85 Other problems
splits create for distributors include lower guarantees and ad-
76. See generally Loew's Inc. (1939), in THE MOVIES IN OUR MIDST 392, 299-402 (G.
Mast ed. 1982).
77. Lazarus, Distribution: A Disorderly Dissertation, in THE MOVIE BUSINESS
BOOK 301, 305-06 (J. Squire ed. 1983).
78. Fellman, supra note 41, at 321; Conant, supra note 7, at 97.
79. See supra note 37.
80. Conant, supra note 12, at 96.
81. United States v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 1979-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,504
(S.D.N.Y. 1976) (Warner Bros. was charged with four-walling in violation of the de-
crees and agreed not to block book for ten years).
82. See, e.g., Statfeld, supra note 12, at 30; Fellman, supra note 41, at 321.
83. Conant, supra note 12, at 96.
84. Fellman, supra note 41, at 320-21; Note, Motion Picture Split Agreements: An
Antitrust Analysis, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 159 (1983).
85. Note, supra note 84, at 160; Myers, supra note 2, at 282.
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vances 6 and the playing of a particular type of film in an inap-
propriate theater.
Early decisions involving splits tended to condone the prac-
tice."8 However, in April 1977, the Department of Justice an-
nounced that it considered splits to be in violation of the
antitrust laws89 and in 1983 the government prevailed in a prod-
uct splitting suit against several Milwaukee exhibitors.90 De-
spite all of these restrictions, agreements not to compete
allegedly continue to be made since exhibitors cannot be forced
to bid.91
The most recent development in licensing arrangements is
the emergence of relationships. Through these relationships,
exhibitors commit their screens to certain favored distribu-
tors.92 With the decline of bidding and the increasing reliance
on negotiation, these relationships are becoming a dominant
factor in motion picture licensing.93 In fact, even if a distribu-
tor decides to put a film out for bids, he may accept a seemingly
high bid from a favored exhibitor and then negotiate down the
terms94 or give the exhibitor a sneak or "five o'clock" look at
the competitors' bids so that the exhibitor can make a slightly
better offer.9 5 While many factors such as theater location and
seating capacity affect a distributor's decision to accept or re-
ject a bid and distributors are not bound to accept the "best"
86. Robbins, Distributors, Exhib 'Marriages' Increase as Bidding Dries Up, Daily
Variety, July 17, 1985, at 3, col. 3.
87. Id. For example, a sensitive film would probably fare better in an intimate
setting while an action-adventure would require the impact of a large screen and high
quality sound.
88. Conant, supra note 12, at 103-06 (citing Wilder Enterprises, Inc. v. Allied Art-
ists Pictures Corp., 632 F.2d 1135 (4th Cir. 1980); Viking Theater Corp. v. Paramount
Film Distrib. Corp., 320 F.2d 285 (3d Cir. 1963), affd per curiam, 378 U.S. 123 (1964);
Seago v. North Carolina Theaters, Inc., 42 F.R.D. 267 (N.C. 1967), afffd per curiam,
388 F.2d 987 (4th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 959 (1968); Dahl, Inc. v. Roy Cooper
Co., 448 F.2d 17 (9th Cir. 1971)).
89. United States Dep't of Justice Press Release, Apr. 1, 1977, at 2; Cieply, supra
note 20.
90. United States v. Capitol Service, Inc., 568 F. Supp. 134 (D. Wis. 1983), affd 756
F.2d 502 (7th Cir.), cert. denied 106 S.Ct. 311 (1985).
91. Robbins, supra note 86. Furthermore, the Department of Justice is continu-
ing to conduct an in-depth investigation into the issue of product splitting and has
indicted many large theater chains. JD Product-Splitting Probe May Touch all US.
Circuits, L.A. Daily J., June 30, 1986, at 1, col. 1.
92. Associated Film Distribution, 614 F. Supp. at 1106, 1107 n.8.
93. Robbins, supra note 86.
94. Associated Film Distribution, 614 F. Supp. at 1106.
95. Id. See also Allied Artists Picture Corp. v. Rhodes, 496 F. Supp. at 430.
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bid, they usually do accept the highest bid96 and any appearance
of impropriety or collusion at the bidding stage is likely to en-
gender legal action by competitors.
There are several benefits to distributor/exhibitor relation-
ships. Distributors are guaranteed screens for their films,
thereby stabilizing release patterns.97 Exhibitors are guaran-
teed films at a lower, noncompetitive price.98 However, the im-
pact on independent exhibitors is adverse. Independent
distributors and exhibitors are caught in the middle because
they do not wield the same market power as larger companies.
These distributors claim that theaters are unavailable for their
films and exhibitors argue that they are effectively denied ac-
cess to the more successful films.99
In retaliation, several smaller entities have filed legal actions
alleging that these relationships constitute violations of the an-
titrust laws.100 In the first of these suits to be decided,101 a di-





Against the backdrop of these past and present licensing
practices and abuses is the issue of blind bidding, which is the
forcing of an exhibitor to bid on a film without having seen it.
Since the late 1970's, most distributors have blind bid the ma-
jority of their films. 10 3 Prior to the recent surge in anti-blind
96. Fellman, supra note 41, at 315.
97. Robbins, supra note 86 ("[Distributors] are guaranteed playing time for their
pix and the release patterns are stable and consistent").
98. Id. (". . . the distribution presidents at the top film companies agree that as
bidding goes out the window, so goes the competition that normally yields better
terms and higher guarantees and advances").
99. See Cieply, supra note 20.
100. See Robbins, supra note 86; In re Motion Picture Licensing Anti-Trust Litiga-
tion, 468 F. Supp. 837 (Jud. Pan. Mult. Lit. 1979) (order granting motion to consoli-
date). Other allegations include blind bidding, block booking, product splitting, term
and admission price fixing, and unreasonable clearances.
101. Universal Amusement Co. v. General Cinema, 635 F. Supp. 1505 (S.D. Tex.
1985) (action by Universal Amusement Co. and its subsidiary Entertainment Projects
against several major distributors and exhibitors alleging violations of the Sherman
Antitrust Act).
102. Tusher, Exhib Loses Anti-Trust Action, Daily Variety, Oct. 7, 1985, at 1, col. 4.
103. Associated Film Distribution, 614 F. Supp. at 1104.
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bidding legislation, invitations to bid were sent out approxi-
mately one year in advance of the film's anticipated release
date. °4 Since these films had not yet been completed, exhibi-
tors were asked to bid on films they could not see.
B. Benefits and Burdens
Distributors have offered several reasons for the continuance
of blind bidding. First, the ability to reserve screen space as far
as a year in advance guarantees the distributor good theaters
during the peak seasons.10 5 Second, blind bidding saves inves-
tors money because it shortens the delay between the produc-
tion and release of a film. 0 6 Third, blind bidding allows a
distributor to capitalize on the timeliness of the subject matter
of his film. 0 7 Finally, the distributor can effectively plan and
build his promotion for a film.10
Exhibitors, on the other hand, believe blind bidding is intol-
erable for two main reasons. First, they do not have the oppor-
tunity to make a valid business judgment on the merits of a
particular film and must commit screen time to a film they
have not seen. 0 9 Second, exhibitors allege that many bid solici-
tations are misleading and fraudulent, thereby causing exhibi-
tors to bid high on films that do not live up to their advance
billing."1
C. Regulation
The federal government has limited blind bidding on three
separate occasions. In 1940, the five major studios entered into
a consent decree with the Department of Justice which prohib-
ited blind bidding for a period of two years."' Under the con-
sent decrees of the late 1940s and early 1950s, exhibitors were
permitted to reject twenty percent of the films they licensed
104. Id. at 1107.
105. Allied Artists Picture Corp. v. Rhodes, 496 F. Supp. at 417; Note, supra note
41, at 1132.
106. Allied Artists Picture Corp. v. Rhodes, 496 F. Supp. at 416.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. See generally NATO Position Paper, supra note 60.
110. Id. at 2-3; Associated Film Distribution, 614 F. Supp. at 1107.
111. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 1940-3 Trade Cas. (CCH) 56,072
(S.D.N.Y. 1940) (action by the Justice Department against Loew's (MGM), Para-
mount, R.K.O., Twentieth Century-Fox and Warner Bros.). The decree could have
prevented blind bidding indefinitely if similar decrees had been obtained from other
distributors. Id.
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through blind bidding.'12 A new decree was entered into in
1968 which limited the number of films a major distributor
could blind bid to three per year.113 The 1968 decree expired in
1975."1 When the 1968 decree was not renewed, the states
picked up where the federal government left off. Since 1978,
modern regulation of blind bidding has originated from state
legislatures.1
15
There are several possible reasons for the popularity of anti-
blind bidding legislation. The most obvious is that, with the ex-
piration of the 1968 decree, blind bidding rapidly became the
most popular method of licensing. By 1977, the major distribu-
tors were blind bidding sixty to ninety-one percent of their
films. 1 6 Second, exhibitors justifiably fear the weakening of
the 1948 consent decrees. Claims have been made that the De-
partment of Justice has let monopolistic practices outlawed by
the decrees go unchecked for the last ten years." 7 Third, it was
112. See supra note 37.
113. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., No. 87-273 (S.D.N.Y., filed Aug. 14,
1968; renewed Jan. 1, 1971).
114. Id.
115. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
116. Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Rhodes, 496 F. Supp. at 417.
117. Tusher, Exhibs Charge Justice Soft on Consent Decrees, Daily Variety, Jan. 16,
1985, at 1, col. 2. Examples of the erosion of the decrees include a 1981 investigation
by the Department of Justice into the possible termination or modification of the de-
crees. In February 1985, the Department decided not to take any action but stated
that its inaction was not meant to suggest it would oppose any future efforts on the
part of the original defendants to terminate the decrees. 6 ENTERTAINMENT L. REP.
vol. 9 at 21 (Feb. 1985). Additionally, some recent decisions have held that a private
plaintiff cannot sue to enforce the consent decrees against the signatories as they are
not considered third party beneficiaries. See, e.g., Cinema Service Corp. v. 20th Cen-
tury-Fox Film Corp., 477 F. Supp. 174, 177 (1979). As early as 1977, General Cinema
was considering investing some $26 million in Columbia-produced and distributed mo-
tion pictures. This deal was eventually dropped in the aftermath of the discovery that
Columbia Pictures President David Begelman was embezzling funds from the com-
pany and Columbia's reinstatement of Begelman as President. D. MCCLINTICK, INDE-
CENT EXPOSURE 193-95, 381 (1982). Non-signatories have begun to enter the
exhibition field. Recently, Samuel Goldwyn Company opened a multiplex theater in
a West Los Angeles shopping mall. Samuel Goldwyn Company Press Release (1985).
Tri-Star has announced plans to purchase United Artists Communications, Inc., one
of the largest exhibitors in the country. Girard, Tri-Star has Exhibition Plans, Daily
Variety, July 15, 1986, at 1, col. 4. The Department of Justice is "monitoring" this
trend. However, it has not found any antitrust violations. Tusher, JD Monitoring
Circuit Takeovers, Daily Variety, July 31, 1986, at 1, col. 4. See also Cieply, supra note
20. It appears that NATO no longer opposes such mergers. NATO Withdraws Opposi-
tion to Distribs Buying Circuits, Daily Variety, Aug. 12, 1986, at 1, col. 4. Finally, a
recent New York District Court judge held that "Warner Bros. exploration of oppor-
tunities for theater acquisition would not be in violation of the Paramount consent
decrees." Court Okays Warner Move Into Exhib'n, Daily Variety, Sept. 11, 1986, at 1,
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in 1977 that the Department of Justice announced that product
splitting was a per-se violation of the antitrust laws.11 Exhibi-
tors, enraged at the federal government's interference with
what they believed to be a legal licensing practice, 1 9 promptly
fought back in an attempt to regain some of the bargaining
power lost by this decision. In 1977, the National Association of
Theater Owners drafted a model bill intended to halt blind bid-
ding. 120 Since most distributors are located in New York and
California, legislators in other states were receptive to this call
col. 3. This appears to be the first time an actual Paramount defendant has investi-
gated reentering exhibition. Because of this, 1986 has been called a year in which "the
motion picture industry returned to the origins of its pre-television growth and pros-
perity in the most massive marriage of distribution and exhibition since the 1948 Para-
mount Consent Decrees. . . ." Tusher, Dist-ribs Pursue Circuit-Buying With a
Passion, Daily Variety, Jan. 5, 1987, at 1, col. 3.
118. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
119. See, e.g., Cieply, supra note 20 (" 'Tell the Justice Department, damn it, to get
the hell out of our business - we're not doing anything illegal' fumed Joel Resnick,
an AMC Entertainment executive vice president .... ).
120. Supra note 7. The model bill provides in pertinent part:
Article I - Purpose
The purpose of this Act is to establish fair and open procedures for the
licensing of motion pictures within the State; prevent unfair and deceptive
acts or practices and unreasonable restraints of trade in the business of mo-
tion picture distribution within the State; promote fair and effective competi-
tion in that business; and benefit the movie-going public by holding down
admission prices to motion picture theatres; expanding the choice of motion
pictures available to the public, and preventing exposure of the public to
objectionable or unsuitable motion pictures by ensuring that exhibitors have
the opportunity to view a picture before committing themselves to exhibit it.
Article III - Blind Bidding
1. Blind bidding is hereby prohibited within the State. No offer or bid
shall be made or accepted, no negotiation for the exhibition or licensing of a
motion picture shall take place, and no license agreement or any of its terms
shall be agreed to, for the exhibition of any motion picture within the State
before the motion picture has been trade screened within the State.
2. Every distributor shall provide reasonable and uniform notice to exhib-
itors within the State of all trade screenings within the State of motion pic-
tures he is distributing.
3. Any purported waiver of the requirements of this Article shall be void
and unenforceable.
Article IV - Guarantees
1. No distributor shall condition the granting or execution of a license
agreement which provides for a fee or other payment to the distributor based
in whole or in part on the attendance or the box office receipts at a theatre
within the State on a guarantee of a minimum payment to the distributor.
No distributor shall solicit, request, or suggest such a guarantee.
2. Any purported waiver of this prohibition in paragraph 1 of the Article
shall be void and unenforceable.
Article V - Advances
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for help from the exhibitors, their local constituents. The first
state anti-blind bidding statute was enacted in April, 1978.121
1. No distributor shall condition the granting or execution of a license
agreement for the exhibition of a motion picture at a theatre within the
State on the exhibitor advancing more than seven days prior to his first exhi-
bition of the motion picture any funds as security for the performance of the
licensing agreement or to be applied to payments under the licensing agree-
ment. No distributor shall solicit, request, or suggest such an advance.
2. Any purported waiver of this prohibition in paragraph 1 of the Article
shall be void and unenforceable.
Article VI - Bidding Procedures
If a distributor solicits, requests or invites (whether directly to one or more
exhibitors or by a general announcement or advertisement or in any other
manner) an offer from more than one exhibitor to license a motion picture in
a particular geographic market for the same run, then, as to that picture in
the market:
1. The distributor shall inform each exhibitor whom he solicits, requests
or invites to make an offer, or who communicates an interest in making an
offer: (a) the number and length of runs for which the picture will be li-
censed, whether it is a first, second, or subsequent run, and the geographic
area for each run; (b) the names of all exhibitors who are being solicited to
make an offer; (c) the date and hour by which offers must be submitted; and
(d) the address where and time when the offers will be opened, which shall
be within the State.
2. All offers shall be in Writing and shall be opened at the same time and
in the presence of any exhibitor, or his agent, who submitted an offer and is
present at such time.
3. After being opened, offers shall be subject to examination by exhibi-
tors who submitted offers, or their agents, for twenty-one (21) business days.
Within seven (7) business days after a motion picture is licensed, the distribu-
tor shall notify in writing each exhibitor who submitted an offer of the terms
of the license agreement and the name of the exhibitor to whom the picture
has been licensed.
4. Once a distributor solicits, requests or invites (whether directly to one
or more exhibitors or by a general announcement or advertisement or in any
other manner) an offer from more than one exhibitor to license a motion
picture in a particular geographic market for the same run, then the distribu-
tor shall license that picture in that market only through the procedures
specified in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of this Article, and the distributor may
solicit re-offers if he does not accept any of the submitted offers.
121. ALA. CODE §§ 8-18-1 to 8-18-6 (1984). The statute provides in pertinent part:
§ 8-18-1. Short Title.
This chapter shall be known as the "Alabama Motion Picture Fair Compe-
tition Act."
§ 8-18-3. Legislative Intent.
The intent of this chapter is to establish fair and open procedures for the
bidding and negotiation for the right to exhibit motion pictures within the
state in order to prevent unfair and deceptive acts or practices and unreason-
able restraints of trade in the business of motion picture distribution within
the state, to promote fair and effective competition in that business and to
ensure that exhibitors have the opportunity to view a motion picture and
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The major difference between this new wave of legislation
and the prior limitations on blind bidding is that this current
movement is occuring at the state and local levels rather than
at the federal level. This is particularly important in assessing
the effects of the statutes since variations between states may
increase the burdens imposed on distributors.
However, the federal government may not be out of the pic-
ture just yet. There are several suits now pending in federal
courts, brought by exhibitors, alleging various antitrust viola-
tions.122 Blind bidding is one of the practices at issue which the
know its contents before committing themselves to exhibiting it in their mu-
nicipalities or towns.
§ 8-18-4. Blind bidding prohibited; notice of trade screening required.
(a) Blind bidding is hereby prohibited within the state. No bids shall be
returnable, no negotiations for the exhibition or licensing of a motion picture
shall take place and no license agreement or any of its terms shall be agreed
to, for the exhibition of any motion picture, before the motion picture has
either been trade screened or before such motion picture, at the option of the
distributor, otherwise has been made available for viewing by all exhibitors
from whom the distributor is soliciting bids or with whom the distributor is
negotiating for the right to exhibit the motion picture.
(b) A distributor shall provide reasonable and uniform notice of the trade
screening of any motion picture to those exhibitors from whom he intends to
solicit bids or with whom he intends to negotiate for the right to exhibit that
motion picture.
(c) Any purported waiver of the prohibition against blind bidding in this
chapter shall be void and unenforceable.
§ 8-18-5. Bidding procedures.
(a) If bids are solicited from exhibitors for the licensing of a motion pic-
ture within the state, then:
(1) The invitation to bid shall specify:
a. Whether the run for which the bid is being solicited is a first, sec-
ond or subsequent run; whether the run is an exclusive or nonexclusive
run; and the geographic area for the run;
b. The names of all the exhibitors who are being solicited;
c. The date and hour the invitation to bid expires; and
d. The time, date and the location, including the address, where the
bids will be opened.
(2) All bids shall be submitted in writing and shall be opened at the
same time and in the presence of those exhibitors, or their agents, who
submitted bids and are present at such time.
(3) Immediately upon being opened, the bids shall be subject to exami-
nation by exhibitors, or their agents, who submitted bids, and who are pres-
ent at the opening. Within 10 business days after the bids are opened, the
distributor shall notify each exhibitor who submitted a bid either the name
of the winning bidder or the fact that none of the bids were acceptable.
(b) Once bids are solicited, the distributor shall license the picture only by
bidding and may solicit rebids if he does not accept any of the submitted bids.
122. See supra note 100.
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exhibitors allege to be a violation of section I of the Sherman
Act.1 23 One commentator has noted, however, that it is unlikely
that the plaintiffs will prevail. 24 Thus, state legislation appears
to be the only line of attack available to the exhibitors.
All twenty-four state anti-blind bidding statutes require
trade screenings prior to licensing, although a few states allow
waiver of this requirement in limited circumstances. For ex-
ample, in South Carolina the trade screening requirement may
be waived if all exhibitors in the county give their written con-
sent. 25 In New Mexico, the requirement is waived if, within
fifteen days of receiving bid invitations, no exhibitor notifies
the distributor that he plans to attend the screening.126
Additionally, most state statutes regulate bidding procedures.
For example, Pennsylvania's statute127 specifies the informa-
123. Id. Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides that "[e]very contract, combination
in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal .... " 15
U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
124. Note, supra note 41, at 1135-36 (discussing Syufy Enterprises v. Columbia Pic-
tures Industries, Inc., No. C-77-0181 (D. Utah filed Aug. 31, 1977) (action by exhibitor
against major distributors alleging, inter alia, blind bidding as a restraint of trade in
violation of the Sherman Act)).
125. S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-540 (Law. Co-op. 1985) provides:
If the first run exhibitors within any county in this State desire to waive
the provisions of this article for the purpose of blind bidding on a movie to be
shown within that county, the exhibitors may waive the provisions and blind
bid if all exhibitors within that county who exhibit first run movies agree in
writing to such a waiver; and the distributors shall have the right to request
waivers for any and all first run exhibitors.
126. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-5A-4(D) (Supp. 1983) provides, "If, within fifteen days
of the date of transmission of the invitation to bid, no exhibitor has notified the dis-
tributor that it will attend the proposed screening, then no trade screening shall be
required prior to the acceptance of bids."
127. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 203-8 (Purdon Supp. 1985) provides:
(a) Invitation to bid contents. - If bids are solicited from exhibitors for
the licensing of a feature motion picture within the Commonwealth, then
the invitations to bid shall specify the following:
(1) Whether the run for which the bid is being solicited is a first, second
or subsequent run; whether the run is an exclusive or nonexclusive run;
and the geographic area for the run.
(2) The names of all exhibitors who are being solicited.
(3) The date and hour the invitation to bid expires.
(4) The time, date, name and address of the location where the bids will
be opened, which location shall be in the exchange centers of this
Commonwealth.
(b) Trade Screening. - If the motion picture that is the subject of the bid
has not already been trade screened within the exchange centers of this
Commonwealth, the distributor soliciting a bid shall include in the invitation
to bid, the date, time and location of the trade screening for such a picture.
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tion which must be contained in a bid solicitation, requires that
all bids be opened simultaneously and in the presence of the
exhibitors who submitted bids, and prohibits distributors from
licensing by negotiation once bid -solicitations have been re-
ceived and rejected.
Another common provision in anti-blind bidding statutes
prohibits or limits advances and guarantees. Some states spec-
ify that the awarding of a license cannot be conditioned on
guarantees and/or advances.128 Other states flatly prohibit ad-
vances and guarantees. 29
(c) Bid submission and opening. - All bids shall be submitted in writing
and shall be opened at the same time and in the presence of those exhibitors,
or their agents, who submitted bids and are present at such time.
(d) Examination of bids. - Any exhibitor, or the agent of an exhibitor,
who submits a bid for a particular run of a feature motion picture may, at
reasonable times within 60 days after a bid is opened, examine any bid that is
made for the same run of the motion picture by another exhibitor. The ex-
hibitor may examine the bids even if the distributor rejects all bids that are
submitted. Within seven business days after a bid for a particular run of a
feature motion picture is accepted, the distributor shall notify in writing each
exhibitor who submitted a bid for that run, the terms of the accepted bid and
the identity of the successful bidder.
(e) Rejection of all bids. - If a distributor issues invitations to bid for a
feature motion picture and rejects all bids received, he shall not enter into a
license agreement for the exhibition of the picture except by means of the
bidding process specified in this section. If the distributor rejects all bids sub-
mitted pursuant to the invitation to bid, he shall notify all exhibitors who
submitted bids that he rejected all bids and shall issue a new invitation to
bid.
128. See, e.g., OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1333.06(B) & (C) (Anderson 1979) which
provides:
(B) No distributor shall condition the granting or execution of a license
agreement on a guarantee of a minimum payment to the distributor, if the
exhibitor is required by the license agreement to make any payments to the
distributor that are based on the attendance or the box office receipts at a
theater at which the motion picture is exhibited.
(C) No distributor shall condition the granting or execution of a license
agreement on the exhibitor's advancing, more than fourteen days prior to his
first exhibition of a motion picture, any money that is to be used as security
for the exhibitor's performance of the license agreement or is to be applied to
any payments that the exhibitor is required by the agreement to make to the
distributor.
129. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 203-5 to -6 (Purdon Supp. 1985) which
provide:
§ 203-5. Guarantees
(a) Minimum payment to distributor. - It shall be unlawful for any li-
cense agreement which provides for a fee or other payment to the distributor
based in whole or in part on the attendance or box office receipts at a theatre
within the Commonwealth to contain or be conditioned upon a guarantee of a
minimum payment to the distributor.
(b) Prohibited guarantees void. - Any provision, agreement or under-
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Finally, Arkansas and Pennsylvania have added clauses
which restrict clearances and runs. In Pennsylvania, for exam-
ple, first runs are limited to forty-two days. After that time,




Some distributors have unsuccessfully challenged the consti-
tutionality of these state anti-blind bidding statutes.'3'
In these actions, the distributors have argued, first, that the
statutes violate the distributors' due process rights under the
fourteenth amendment. 3 2 Because the states have wide discre-
tion in enacting legislation in furtherance of economic poli-
cies, 133 and because the anti-blind bidding statutes were
arguably enacted for such a purpose,3 the due process claim
has been rejected.35 Second, the plaintiffs have claimed that
the statutes deprive distributors of their first amendment right
of free speech, applicable to states through the fourteenth
standing which provides for such a guarantee shall be void and purported
waiver of the prohibition in subsection (a) shall be void and unenforceable.
§ 203-6. Advances
(a) Advances prohibited. - It shall be unlawful for any license agreement
for the exhibition of a feature motion picture at a theatre within the Com-
monwealth to contain or be conditioned upon a provision, agreement or un-
derstanding that the exhibitor shall advance any funds prior to the exhibition
of the picture as security for the performance of the license agreement or to
be applied to payments under such an agreement.
(b) Prohibited advances void. - Any provision, agreement or understand-
ing which provides for such an advance shall be void and any purported
waiver of the prohibition in subsection (a) shall be void and unenforceable.
130. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 203-7 (Purdon Supp. 1985) which provides:
No license agreement shall be entered into between distributor and exhibi-
tor to grant an exclusive first run or an exclusive multiple first run for more
than 42 days without provision to expand the run to second run or subse-
quent run theatres within the geographic area and license agreements and
prints of said feature motion picture shall be made available by the distribu-
tor to those subsequent run theatres that would normally be served on a sub-
sequent run availability.
131. See, e.g., Associated Film Distribution, 614 F. Supp. 1100 (D.C. Pa. 1985); Al-
lied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Rhodes, 496 F. Supp. 408 (S.D. Ohio 1980); Paramount
Pictures Corp. v. Busbee, 297 S.E.2d 250 (Ga. 1982) (Weltner, J., dissenting).
132. See, e.g., Allied Artists Picture Corp. v. Rhodes, 496 F. Supp. at 428.
133. Id. (citing Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 533 (1934), which held that state
legislation is constitutional if it rationally relates to a legitimate governmental
objective).
134. Id. at 429.
135. Id. at 431-32.
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amendment,1 3 6 because the statutes have a "direct and immedi-
ate impact" on motion pictures.3 7 There is no question that
motion pictures are speech deserving of first amendment pro-
tection;138 however, since the statutes are content-neutral 3 9
and only incidentally affect free speech, they will be upheld
whenever there is a valid government interest.140 The states'
economic interest noted above is considered such an interest.' 4'
Likewise, the distributors have failed in asserting their claim
that the statutes discriminate against interstate commerce. 42
However, this situation is similar to that addressed in Exxon
Corp. v. Governor of Maryland,143 wherein the United States
Supreme Court held that when the legislation in question does
not discriminate between in-state and out-of-state companies, it
does not violate the commerce clause even if there are no in-
state companies which would be affected by the statute. 4 4 The
plaintiffs' other unsuccessful commerce clause arguments have
been that the statutes deprive interstate commerce of national
uniformity,145 and are an impermissible burden on interstate
commerce.1
46
Finally, the courts have rejected claims that the statutes are
preempted by the federal copyright laws 147 and that they "sanc-
tion and mandate certain collusive conduct which is violative of
the federal antitrust laws, 148 namely exhibitor product split-
ting and price interference.
136. Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 368 (1931).
137. Allied Artists Picture Corp. v. Rhodes, 496 F. Supp. at 432.
138. Id.; Interstate Circuit v. Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 682 (1968); United States v. Para-
mount, Inc., 334 U.S. at 161.
139. Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Rhodes, 496 F. Supp. at 432.
140. Id. at 432 and 433 (discussing Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S.
36, 49 (1960), which held that general regulatory statutes which are not intended to
control content should be constitutionally upheld when they are supported by valid
governmental interests).
141. Id. at 435.
142. Id. at 437.
143. 437 U.S. 117 (1978).
144. Id. at 126.
145. Allied Artists Picture Corp. v. Rhodes, 496 F. Supp. at 435. See also Bibb v.
Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520 (1959).
146. Allied Artists Picture Corp. v. Rhodes, 496 F. Supp. at 438. See also Pike v.
Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
147. Allied Artists Picture Corp. v. Rhodes, 496 F. Supp. at 441.
148. Id. at 448.
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IV
The Impact of Modern Regulations
In assessing the impact of these modern regulations on the
motion picture industry, it is instructive to examine the effects
on the five distinct interests involved: major distributors, in-
dependent distributors, large theater circuits, smaller exhibi-
tors, and the public.
A. Major Distributors
The major distributors argue that the new statutes cause
costly delays in the scheduled releases of first-run motion pic-
tures.149 When pictures can be licensed while still in produc-
tion, delays in completion rarely affect release dates. However,
if a film must be trade screened before it is licensed, the time it
takes to set up the screenings and enter into licensing agree-
ments may be enough to push back the release date. 5 ° When a
release date must be pushed back, the film financing interest
costs alone can be staggering.151 Distributors also suffer from
the loss of effective advertising,1 5 2 the inability to capitalize on
the timeliness of a film,.53 and the loss in revenues if a film is
not released during a peak season.'54 As the courts have noted,
such delays are rare and are more often caused by problems in
completing the picture on time than by the requirements of the
statutes, since licensing can be completed very soon after the
screening. 5
Distributors also claim that without screen commitments, ad-
vertising and promotion are severely hampered. 5 6 However,
while it is true that some types of advertising, such as in-thea-
ter trailers and poster boards, will be affected by the statutes,
national advertising campaigns will run regardless of the par-
ticular theater involved and probably will be sufficient to at-
tract the public's attention.
149. Associated Film Distribution, 614 F. Supp. at 1104, 1108; Allied Artists Picture
Corp. v. Rhodes, 496 F. Supp. at 421.
150. Note, supra note 41, at 1132.
151. Supra note 60; Myers, supra note 2, at 282 (the additional annual interest cost
on a film released six months late is at least $15 million).
152. Associated Film Distribution, 614 F. Supp. at 1104.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 1108; Allied Artists Picture Corp. v. Rhodes, 496 F. Supp. at 421-23.
156. Associated Film Distribution, 614 F. Supp. at 1108.
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Another problem that distributors face is the cost of trade
screening. Because the prints produced for the trade screen-
ings are duplicated from work prints or rough cuts, these prints
become worthless after the screening.'57 Each print costs ap-
proximately $1,500.158 Duping (copying the original work print
or rough cut), shipping, and security combine to make the aver-
age cost of trade screening a film around $50,000.' s 9
Diminished revenues are also a problem for distributors.
Distributor income will be reduced by two factors in addition to
the losses incurred because of possible delays. First, many dis-
tributors will probably opt for negotiation rather than bidding
in states which require trade screenings.16° For example, 20th
Century-Fox has decided to negotiate in all states due to the
complexities of the various state statutes.1 61 Distributors gener-
ally prefer negotiation when they are faced with an impending
release date. Negotiation is quicker and can be completed in a
telephone call while bidding may take several weeks. Negotia-
tion is especially preferable if the statute requires rebidding
rather than allowing for negotiation if the first round bids are
unacceptable. 62
Since negotiation reduces the effect of free competition in ob-
taining high licensing terms, the terms may be lower. In Penn-
sylvania, for example, film rentals received during regulated
times were, on the average, four percent lower than during un-
regulated periods.. 63 Additionally, open bidding provisions may
cause an exhibitor to withdraw an exceedingly high bid once he
views the competing bids. 64 However, trade screenings and the
open bidding procedures may in fact raise the terms on a good
film.'
6 5
Second, income may be lost in states which prohibit guaran-
tees. As stated above, approximately one to five percent of a
157. Robbins, Antiblind-Bid Laws Cause Problems But Distribs Learn to Cope,
Daily Variety, July 3, 1985, at 2, col. 3.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Robbins, supra note 86; But see Associated Film Distribution, 614 F. Supp. at
1112, 1114;.
161. No More Film Bidding For Fox, Daily Variety, Oct. 23, 1985, at 1, col. 4.
162. Telephone interview with Anne Grupp, Esq., supra note 13.
163. Associated Film Distribution, 614 F. Supp. at 1113 (although the true worth of
these figures has been questioned).
164. Myers, supra note 2, at 281-82 (describing an instance where an exhibitor sub-
mitted three bids and then withdrew the highest).
165. Associated Film Distribution, 614 F. Supp. at 1112 n.20.
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distributor's income is in the form of unearned guarantees, 166 a
source of funds which is regulated in some states. 67
B. Major Exhibitors
While the major distributors are undeniably hurt by anti-
blind bidding statutes, large exhibitors are greatly benefited.
Most importantly, the statutes protect exhibitors from the dis-
tributors' deceptive trade practices. 68 Exhibitors have long ar-
gued that bid solicitations are often false and misleading.
169
One such example was the bid solicitation for the film Best De-
fense, which promised a comedy starring Eddie Murphy and
Dudley Moore. In fact, no more than twenty minutes of the
film featured Eddie Murphy, and he and Dudley Moore were
never on the screen together. 7 0 While state deceptive trade
practices laws are available to exhibitors who have been mis-
led,17 ' exhibitors are reluctant to use them because they fear
that distributors will refuse to license films to exhibitors who
file such suits. Prevention definitely appears to be the best so-
lution to this problem.
Exhibitors also argue that by seeing a film prior to licensing
they can obtain films which are acceptable to their local com-
munities. 72 While this may be true in some suburban and rural
areas, an exhibitor will rarely forego the anticipated profits
from an expected blockbuster merely because it contains some
offensive language or portrayals.
Another advantage the statutes may yield exhibitors is re-
dress of the imbalance in bargaining power which has resulted
in lower exhibitor profits. 173 However, the reasons for this per-
ceived imbalance are disappearing. Generally, it is assumed
that a reduction in output of films by the few major distributors
causes increased competition between the many exhibitors,
thus improving contract terms for distributors. 174 However, re-
cently, the major studios have been increasing their output. In
166. See supra notes 52 & 53 and accompanying text.
167. See supra notes 128 & 129 and accompanying text.
168. Associated Film Distribution, 614 F. Supp. at 1107.
169. See, e.g., NATO Position Paper, supra note 109.
170. Associated Film Distribution, 614 F. Supp. at 1107.
171. See, e.g., id.
172. Id.
173. See, e.g., id. at 1104.




1984, feature film releases in the United States were up thir-
teen percent over 1983,1'" and 1986 figures were four percent
higher than the previous year."6 Furthermore, 1986 produc-
tion skyrocketed, with fifty-three percent more pictures put
into production than in 1985.117
Additionally, one might expect competition to be increased
by the growth in the number of new screens.1 8 This is caused
by the exhibitors themselves, especially the large chains.'79
While there are thousands of individual exhibitors nationwide,
in any one geographic area relatively few dominate the mar-
ket.180 Since these chains generally operate the most sought-
after screens, they have as much bargaining power as the dis-
tributors. In fact, cities dominated by one large chain place dis-
tributors at a total disadvantage in negotiating.181
One definite disadvantage the statutes hold for exhibitors
when licensing motion pictures is the inability to evaluate all
the upcoming releases at the same time. Some films will be
ready for screening before others and, since speed is not neces-
sarily the hallmark of a good film, pictures which are screened
early arguably are more likely to be licensed at terms favorable
to the distributor. While exhibitors may, theoretically, choose
to pass up an early but poor film and wait to view the other
upcoming films, economics dictate that they can wait only so
long for fear of being "stuck" with an even poorer picture or,
even worse, with no picture at all.
C. Independent Distributors
Independent distributors may be put in the toughest position
of all. While the courts have suggested that independents will
benefit because exhibitors will be judging films based on their
true merit,8 2 it is equally possible that exhibitors will continue
to choose films with major stars or directors over independent
175. Cohn, U.S. Releases of Feature Pix Up 13% in '84, Daily Variety, Jan. 3, 1985,
at 1, col. 4.
176. Cohn, Distribs Load Up '86 Pipeline, Daily Variety, Dec. 31, 1986, at 1, col. 4.
177. McCarty, Film Production Soars in '86, Daily Variety, Jan. 5, 1986, at 1 col. 4.
178. Supra notes 20 & 21 and accompanying text.
179. Id.
180. Plaintiffs' Trial Brief at 17-20, Associated Film Distribution.
181. See generally id. at 18 (noting that the Cinemette circuit dominates the first-
run market in Erie, Pa. and that General Cinema operates most of the first-run thea-
ters in Scranton, Pa.).
182. See, e.g., Associated Film Distribution, 614 F. Supp. at 1108.
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features by unknown filmmakers, even if the former are of
poorer quality. Audiences are attracted to films with big
names, especially since the advertising expenditures on these
films are far greater. Second, due to the relationships noted
above,'83 an exhibitor may choose to take a major's film over an
independent's merely to maintain his relationship with the ma-
jor and have a better chance at exhibiting the next blockbuster.
For the small distributor, the most burdensome aspect of the
legislation is the cost. Independents do not have the ability to
absorb the extra costs of trade screening as easily as the ma-
jors.181 To an independent distributor, $50,000 is a large sum.
While the majors have several branch offices across the country
to handle distribution, 85 many independents have only one of-
fice. It is much more difficult and costly for independents to
keep track of the varying statutes, find and rent screening
rooms, and secure personnel to run the screening. 8 6
For the independent distributor, the statutory requirements
can often lead to absurd results. For example, a small distribu-
tor of religious films may want to license a particular film to
church groups in a state with an anti-blind bidding statute. To
do so, he must notify all the exhibitors in the area of the




For the most part, small exhibitors may benefit in much the
same way as larger exhibitors, especially in the states which
limit or prohibit advances and guarantees. While a large chain
is usually able to advance money to distributors out of its own
revenues, a small exhibitor often must take out a loan to com-
pete.8 8 And while a chain can usually sustain the losses associ-
ated with large guarantees which are not made up by the box
office, one such loss may be enough to close down a small thea-
ter. 8 9 However, there are some substantial burdens on the
small exhibitor that outweigh the benefits. The increase in the
183. See supra notes 92-102 and accompanying text.
184. See generally Plaintiff's Trial Brief at 62, 63, Associated Film Distribution.
185. See, e.g., Myers, supra note 2, at 276.
186. See supra note 184.
187. See Plaintiff's Opening Statement at 39, Associated Film Distribution.
188. See supra notes 160-61 and accompanying text.
189. Associated Film Distribution, 614 F. Supp. at 1109-10.
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role and amount of negotiation caused by the statutes19 ° also
works against the small exhibitor because it enhances the im-
portance of the relationships between the major distributors
and large chains. Small exhibitors are rarely, if ever, able to
enter into similar arrangements.
E. The Public
Finally, the anti-blind bidding statutes may have some im-
pact on the public. Both courts and commentators claim that
high terms and large guarantees and advances drive up box of-
fice ticket prices. 191 However, since 1967, ticket prices have
risen less than prices in general as reflected by the Consumer
Price Index,'92 and not nearly as quickly as the cost of making a
motion picture.
193
The courts have also argued that exhibitors hold over bad
films in order to recoup large guarantees 94 and that limitations
on guarantees "benefit the public by reducing the incentive of
exhibitors to play motion pictures beyond their useful life."' 95
However, it seems that an exhibitor would rather cut his losses
in the best possible way, including substituting a good film for a
poor one, in the hope of making up for the lost guarantee with
the increased profits on the new film. If this is the case, then
the argument can work in the opposite direction: to minimize
guarantee losses, an exhibitor will show new releases sooner
than if there were no guarantee.
Another argument, unique to Pennsylvania due to its unu-
sual statute, is that the ban on first runs longer than forty-two
days enables films to move into suburban areas more quickly.
96
However, since the recent trend on distribution has been to
190. In reality, however, these theaters are not the ones which generally receive
licenses on important films commanding high guarantees. Major films are rarely seen
in an independent theater because the facilities are generally not comparable to those
owned by the chains.
191. E.g., Associated Film Distribution, 614 F. Supp. at 1110 n.15; Lazarus, supra
note 74, at 307.
192. BUREAU Of LABOR STATISTICS, CPI DETAILED REPORT 4, 23 (Dec. 1984).
193. Industry Economic Review and Audience Profile, in THE MOVIE BUSINESS
BOOK 353 (J. Squire ed. 1983). From 1972 to 1981, the production costs of films made
by the major studios rose 475.2%. This figure does not include interest or advertising
increases. Id.
194. E.g., Associated Film Distribution, 614 F. Supp. at 1110.
195. Id.
196. Associated Film Distribution, 614 F. Supp. at 1112.
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open films on more screens in more areas,'9 7 this provision will
probably have little effect.
V
Conclusion
Since the Paramount consent decrees were executed, 198 mo-
tion picture licensing has become a complicated and often cut-
throat process. Various practices, some of which have been
abolished, were and are used by distributors and exhibitors to
gain an edge in their dealings with one another.
Distributors have used blind bidding for nearly ten years to
minimize the risks inherent in the film industry, arguably at
the expense of exhibitors. Major exhibitors have successfully
lobbied state legislatures and have been rewarded with anti-
blind bidding statutes which benefit them alone. These stat-
utes offer few benefits to the public. Furthermore, modern
regulation of blind bidding works to the detriment of not only
major distributors, who have adapted, but also independent dis-
tributors and small exhibitors, who may not be able to over-
come the new burdens imposed on them.
197. Fellman, supra note 41, at 314.
198. See supra note 1.
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